Concurrence Legal Terms

One case that would meet the standard of agreement would be where an entrepreneur who hates a rival emerges from the rival`s ladder below her while she works, resulting in serious injuries. The contractor demonstrated both a guilty mind and a guilty act. On the other hand, if the competing contractor simply passes in front of a construction site, if a fall occurs, it is not a crime, even if the contractor expresses his joy at the fate of the rival. The deceased entrepreneur may not appreciate the rival`s satisfaction with the breach, but no legal error has occurred. Thesaurus: All synonyms and antonyms for compliance In law is the simultaneous commission of a crime with the simultaneous intention of causing harm. It is necessary to prove the agreement in order to successfully argue that someone has committed a crime and should be held legally responsible for it, except in certain cases. This concept is more common in criminal law, although it can also be a problem in some types of civil cases. Lawyers may use a variety of means to attempt to establish or refute a match in a particular case. Things can become particularly difficult when people rely on the single-transaction principle, as the defense may argue that a reasonable person would not have assumed that one action would result in further violations.

To borrow again from our hostile contractors if Contractor A fails to call for help because other workers are on site and should have seen the accident, the defence could argue that any injury sustained is the result of negligence on the part of the work crew because they failed to detect and remedy the original injury. According to 49 CFR 7.2, the agreement means that “the consent of the person to be consulted is required for the action in question to be taken.” In Western jurisprudence, agreement (also contemporary or simultaneity) is the obvious need to prove the simultaneous occurrence of actus reus (“guilty act”) and mens rea (“guilty mind”) in order to justify a crime; except in the case of breaches of strict liability. Theoretically, if the actus reus does not correspond to the mens rea of the time, then no crime has been committed. The guilty act is known in law as actus reus, while the intent to commit crimes is mens rea or “guilty spirit.” The requirement for proof of compliance is an important part of the criminal justice system because it establishes a clear link between the desire to commit a crime and the crime itself. And for the sake of completeness: if A commits a crime with an actus reus and a mens rea, this has no influence on the responsibility that A later regrets the crime and causes compensation. So, if A steals goods from B, but then returns them with money to compensate for the damage caused during the forced intrusion, this cannot change the fact that there was a actus reus accompanied by an appropriate mens rea. A crime has been committed, although subsequent conscience-based behaviour during the sentencing phase of the trial is a relevant consideration. Another way to justify responsibility in such a situation would be to consider an omission at the time of the formation of mens rea. In the first example, responsibility arises from the reckless inability to move the man or from the deliberate blindness that he was in danger.

In the Fagan case, the liability arises from the failure to remove the car. The law recognizes that sometimes a sequence of events clearly leads to harm, even if the guilty act and the guilty mind are not necessarily at the same time. In the example above, if Contractor A sees Contractor B fall and rejoices in it, it is not a crime, but if Contractor A leaves Contractor B in a position where more serious injury or death is likely, it will be a crime, even if Contractor A is not present when the secondary injury occurs. According to the logic of the so-called single transaction principle, the actions of Contractor A clearly resulted in harm to Contractor B, and the first Contractor participated in these actions with the intention of taking damages. For example, suppose the defendant accidentally injures a pedestrian while driving. The accused, aware of the collision, rushes out of the car, only to find that the victim is a hated enemy. At this point, the accused joyfully proclaims his joy at having caused the injury. The treaty rule is that no crime has been committed.

The actus reus is complete and there is no ratification rule in criminal law. While in the Agency`s law, a contractor can accept a transaction retroactively, as if the agent had originally had the right to enter into an agreement with a third party (“ratification” of the agent`s decision), and thus be held liable under that agreement, an alleged infringer cannot retroactively accept a news reus and plead guilty. To be convicted, the defendant must have formed the mens rea before or during the commission of the actus reus. In the vast majority of cases, this rule works without difficulty. The latter example raises another question, namely that it is sufficient to base a conviction on the existence of mens rea at a given time when the events encompassing the individual transaction occur. The fact that the accused may mistakenly believe that they have successfully committed the crime does not preclude a conviction. For example, suppose A begins to strangle B and, because he believes that B is dead, leaves the “body” in nearby forests, where B dies of exposure. A is still convicted of murder, although the corresponding behavior of leaving the body was not accompanied by a mens rea. Not all events are limited to a specific point in time. Normal physical rules of cause and effect can result in a number of interlocking circumstances conspiring to cause particular harm. If the facts of the above example are slightly changed, so that the accident occurred at night in a tight curve on a very quiet country road.

When the driver sees the victim lying on the road, he simply leaves the unconscious person where they fell. A few hours later, when a second car innocently arrives around the corner and kills the victim, the first driver happily sleeps in his bed. Thus, he maintains that he did not have a mens rea at the time of his death and therefore cannot be guilty of murder. This argument fails because of the so-called single transaction principle. Not all actions that form the basis of a news reus are individual and unrelated events. When a sequence of events is inevitably connected, it can be considered a single transaction. As long as the required mens rea is formed before the sequence begins or during the sequence (before it ends), the defendant is liable. But not all factual sequences can be so conveniently rethought as an omission. For example, suppose A sees his enemy B and decides to attack him. A takes a stick and starts chasing B, who runs into a hotel, climbs the stairs and enters a room and locks the door behind him. A hammer on the door and shouts threats. A then sees a fire axe in a glass cabinet nearby.

He tells B that he went out for the axe and that he will open the door. When A leaves, B is so scared that he jumps out of the window and breaks his legs. Even though A may not have immediately intended to hurt B at the critical moment B jumped, the fear was triggered with reasonable intent and B would not have been desperate enough to jump if that fear had not existed. [It is fair to exclude liability if B`s fear is completely inappropriate in the face of A`s behavior because B`s self-induced injury will break the causal chain]. Middle English, “concentration”, borrowed from the medieval Latin concurrentia “gathering, simultaneous occurrence”, noun derived from the Latin concurrent-, competitors “converging, simultaneously” In the previous example, the victim would not have died if the first driver had not left her in a dangerous place on the road. The law treats the Actus Reus as if it had started with the accidental injury and ended in death. In Fagan v Metropolitan Police Commissioner (1969) 1 QB 439, a police officer ordered the accused to park his car and reluctantly complied. He accidentally drove the car on the policeman`s foot and when the policeman said “Get off my foot”, he said “Fuck you, you can wait” and cut off the ignition. [1] Because of the steel cap in his boot, the officer`s foot was not in real danger, but the Divisional Court ruled that this could constitute a joint attack. Although accidentally, the driver had the car rested on his foot. This actus reus was a persistent condition as long as the car rested on the officer`s foot and the mens rea was formed before the car was removed. Realistic or not, the officer acknowledged the possibility of injury, so the crime of joint attack was complete.