The question of affordance is therefore on two levels with regard to the legal subject. First, to what extent does technological support offer the institutional mode of existence of the legal subject? And secondly, what offers does the legal entity have in the legal-institutional dimension that is granted in this way? The answers to these two questions are closely linked; Each depends on the other and cannot be considered in isolation. The second class of affordances derives separately or perhaps in parallel with the affordances of the text, which make possible the institutional fact of legal subjectivity in the first place. Even before the adoption of the Bill of Rights, the courts have always ruled and ruled that a fetus is not a legal person and therefore has no right to life that can be applied on its behalf.  Following the enactment of the Bill of Rights and the Choice of Termination of Pregnancy Act, the entire Termination of Pregnancy was challenged with reference to the Bill of Rights in Christian Lawyers Association of South Africa v. Minister of Health. The plaintiffs cited the constitutional guarantee of the right to life and argued that since life begins at conception, any abortion is unconstitutional. The defendants invoked an exception to the plaintiffs` statements, and this exception was upheld by the court: that it did not disclose a plea because the Constitution does not confer any legal subjectivity on a fetus and therefore does not confer any rights on it.  Abortion, which is legal in South Africa, is governed by the Choice of Termination of Pregnancy Act.
Only a legal person can perform legal acts, such as: the conclusion of a contract; Other “things” may be relevant to the law, such as cars, mountains, or money, but these “legal objects” are what legal entities are traded with. Beyond this balancing role, legal subjectivity, which allows a textual normativity, allows us to “count as a human being” bilaterally. On the one hand, it protects our individuality (our moral right to develop a subjective view of the world), and on the other hand, it subjects us to the normative order of the law. It is therefore a framework of constraints that allows and protects us simultaneously and in symbiosis. It is the interrelationship between empowerment and protection: the abstraction that protects people also allows for a certain degree of certainty in the interactions between legal acts. Natural and legal persons have rights protected by law. Logically, they also have obligations that they cannot ignore, because if they cannot be sanctioned in accordance with the applicable laws. the ability to possess legal rights and exercise legal powers, the ability to interpret the sources of law to determine exactly what the state of rights, powers and obligations is at any given time, and to challenge them before a competent judge, there are legal requirements to be considered a person by law.
Only if a company acquires legal capacity or legal personality can it have rights and obligations. The object of the law is that which has the rights or obligations that are the subject of the legal relationship. Contrary to the purpose of the law, the subject may be an entity or a natural person. There is still no general legal definition of death in South African law. Whereas previously the death test was filled with the irreversible absence of natural cardiac and pulmonary activity, there is no longer an exact time when death can be called occurrence; It is a process that can extend over time. In S v. Williams, the court followed the “traditional view of community” when it declared the deceased legally dead when she stopped breathing and her heart stopped beating. However, under the National Health Act, “death” means brain death.  The Birth and Death Registration Act does not contain a useful definition. As an artificial construct constructed from institutional facts, the legal subject is in no way “found” or given – it is a written term that is in any case created by acts of speech that follow treaty procedures specified in positive law. This conception includes features that are de facto interoperable both with other legal entities (including those of a completely different nature: a natural person may enter into contracts with a company) and with the transactions that the law allows by assigning rights, powers and obligations to the legal entity. They are holders of rights payable to third parties.
That is, they can claim a different behavior or behavior. An example of an active subject is the creditor. The idea of legal subjectivity is the framework within which all this is made possible, regardless of the content of the individual rights and powers themselves, which will vary from one jurisdiction to another.