Anvar P.V. v. P.K.Basheer & Ors (2014) is of immense importance in today`s technology-driven world, as the Supreme Court ruled in this remarkable case on the admissibility of electronic evidence in court taking into account Section 65B of the Indian Evidence Act 1872. In interpreting the application of sections 63, 65 and 65B of the 1872 Act, the Supreme Court set aside its earlier decision in State (NCT of Delhi) v Navjot Sandhu (2005), commonly referred to as the Attack on Parliament case. The Chamber of the Supreme Court, composed of three judges, composed of the President of the Supreme Court R. M. Lodha and Justices Kurian Joseph and Rohinton Fali Nariman, who concluded that an electronic recording as secondary evidence in court is not admissible as evidence unless the requirements of section 65B are met, and issued the following opinion: The law of evidence is affected as the law of the forum that guides courts and assists them in: draw a conclusion while dealing with a particular case. Not to be confused as evidence, evidence leads the court to prove or disprove something. The Indian Evidence Act, 1872 is an adjective law that sets out the provisions that Indian courts must follow when accepting and determining the admissibility of evidence presented to them. The underlying principle that sets the law of evidence in motion was confirmed in Ram Jas v. Surendra Nath (1980), where it has been held that the law of evidence is the law that does not affect the substantive rights of the parties, but contributes to facilitating justice for them. This article provides a list of precedents that serve as a source for the interpretation of the 1872 Act by Indian courts, which may contribute to a better understanding of the concepts of the law of evidence. The High Court of Bombay, in light of the case of Bhimsha Subanna Pawar v.
The State of Maharashtra (1996) took into account circumstances in which the court did not have independent evidence to uphold the conviction of the accused. Admittedly, in the present case, the Hon`ble High Court concludes that, in the absence of independent evidence, the court must carefully consider the evidence of police witnesses which, if found to be a reliable source, will form the basis of the accused`s conviction. Thus, if assault weapons were discovered in accordance with the accused`s testimony and there was no evidence that would reflect hostility between the police inspector and the accused, it is justified and safe to believe the inspector`s statement, which has not been confirmed with respect to the weapon discovered. The Supreme Court of India in Kalyan Kumar Gogoi v. Ashutosh Agnihotri and Anr. (2011) emphasized that hearsay evidence is not considered relevant evidence under the Indian Evidence Act of 1872. The foundations of the law of evidence state that hearsay evidence is inadmissible in court because it is inaccurate and vague in nature. In its observation, the Court established certain parameters on the basis of which hearsay evidence is not of great relevance to the law, namely: The court held that in order to invoke section 145 with respect to the appointment of a witness, it is important to prove that the witness challenged what the testimony had previously done. Rejection must be proven. If the witness admits the previous testimony, no such remedy may be used. The decision of the Supreme Court of India in Dr.
Sunil Clifford Daniel v. State of Punjab (2012) concerned the interrelationship between Section 162(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 and Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. Article 162, paragraph 1, reads as follows: “A statement made by a person to a police officer in the course of an investigation which, when recorded in writing, is not signed by the person who made it”, which clearly indicates by its wording that the law requires that a statement made before the investigator: shall not be signed by the witness who gave it. For simplicity, the witness is not bound by his testimony before the authority concerned. It should be noted, however, that the provision of subsection 162(1) C.R.P.C. does not apply to statements made under section 27 of the Evidence Act. After observation, the Supreme Court concluded that the investigator was not required to obtain the initials of a defendant in the statements attributed to him in the preparation of the notice of seizure under section 27 of the 1872 Act. But if such initials were obtained, the same is not considered illegal.
The court explained the purpose of section 162 of the Indian Evidence Act. The purpose of this provision and its reservation is to protect the accused against false statements by witnesses at the time of the inquiry. The court held that the testimony of witnesses could be under pressure from the police investigating the case, so that it would be prejudicial to the accused to admit such testimony as evidence. Der Fall Roop Kumar v. Mohan Thedani (2003) revolves around the scope and scope of sections 91 and 92 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, which have been explained by the Supreme Court of India, as discussed in Subbiah Mudaliar v. Gopala MudaliarIt was decided that a statement in a previous claim under subsection 32(5) The fact that the person: The person who made the statement has special means of knowledge must be proven by independent evidence, otherwise it would be in a circle to argue that the document itself proves the relationship and therefore has special means of knowledge. Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, which deals with the amount of information obtained from the accused that can be proved, is nothing more than a reservation to sections 25 and 26 of the Act, as stated by the Supreme Court of India in Bodh Raj @ Bodha And Ors v. State Of Jammu And Kashmir (2002). The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether the weapon used in the attack, discovered on the basis of information provided by the defendant in custody, was sufficient to establish the guilt of the accused. The Court`s judgments are listed below: The recent Supreme Court decision in the case of Mangala Waman Karandikar (D) TR. Lrs. v.
Prakash Damodar Ranad (2021) highlighted Articles 92 and 95, which deal with the exclusion of evidence from oral agreements and evidence to document the significance of existing facts. The question before the Court was whether or not the provisions of Articles 92 and 95 applied to ambiguous documents. While noting that while the documentary terms of a contract are clear, Articles 92 and 95 are not applicable, the Supreme Court established the following decision points: Another relevant case that has appeared in relation to Section 65B before the Supreme Court of India is Arjun Panditrao Khotkar v. Kailash Kushanrao Gorantyal and Ors (2020). Judges Rohinton Fali Nariman, S. Ravindra Bhat and V. Ramasubramanian pointed out that the Evidence Act prohibits proof of an oral electronic recording if the requirements of the statutory provision of Section 65B of the Act are not met or met. The court established the friendly link between the Information Technology Act 2000 and the Indian Evidence Act 1872, finding that section 65B of the latter was a complete code in itself and that, therefore, the previous legislation and the legislative provisions of the Evidence Act constituted legal mechanisms against technological superiority.
A list of case law has been discussed here that contributes to the understanding of certain provisions of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, which are of immense importance. As technology overwhelms human intelligence, Section 65B of the Indian Evidence Act 1872, which deals with the admissibility of electronic evidence and was incorporated into law by India`s Evidence Amendment Act 2000, has been considered in a series of recent cases. The already discussed decision of the Supreme Court of India on the admissibility of electronic evidence may take into account the importance of the law of evidence in recent times. The law of evidence is a branch of law that has gained prominence since time immemorial and, therefore, it is only through remarkable judgments of the judiciary that the purpose underlying the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act of 1872 can be recognized. The Court held that the extent to which information is admissible must depend on the precise nature of the established fact to which the information must relate. Article 27 seems to be based on the idea that if a fact is actually discovered as a result of a given piece of information, there is some guarantee that the information was true and that this can therefore certainly be admitted into evidence. The court held that secondary evidence is admissible if it purports to prove the existence, conditions and content of a document if it is found that the original document is in the custody of the person against whom the document is sought or is beyond the reach or is not legally required to produce such a document.